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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. FACTUAL EVENTS 
The parties hereto entered into a contract for the delivery of logs for the building of a 
cabin. The materials were to be delivered by appellant to respondent at a lot in the Royal 
Elk Subdivision in Camas County, Idaho. 
The parties entered into preliminary discussions in the Spring of 2004 and extended 
throughout the summer. (Tr. pp. 112-113). A contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, (Tr., page 8. L. 
16-20) was admitted into evidence and described the details of the arrangement. The 
contract was signed by the respondent on August 12, 2004; and, by the appellant on 
September 22, 2004. The contract consisted of three (3) pages with a fourth page that was 
sent to Appellant in November of 2004. Appellant did not agree to the fourth page 
attachment or amendment. (See, Tr. p. 103:16-25 through p. 105; p. 125, L.1-18; 241-242). 
The respondent had paid a down-payment, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, dated May 28, 2004 
(Tr. p. 8, L. 16-20) in contemplation of the contract. The contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, had 
various changes by way of hand-written notations modifying the sums for the payment of 
services, hauling and material (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
The contract provided that "customer will pay for shipping of logs from log site to 
his property site". (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). Further, the contract provided "Log Shell is sold 
F.O.B. Graugeville, Idaho". In the event of dispute, Arbitration was the contractual 
obligation for resolution as contained in paragraph G of the contract. (See, Plaintiff's 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 1 
Exhibit 3). Arbitration was the sole remedy. The parties did not agree to a different manner 
of resolution viz., initiating court action. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and 2 (fr. p. 8, L.16-20) were preliminary questions and 
discussions leading to the contract finalization. The parties could not enter into a final 
contract until later that Fall. (See, Tr. pp. 112-115; 167-169). No delivery date was agreed 
upon. (fr. pp.114:20-25, 115:118, 119:6-13). The parties had no final contract as of the date of 
sending the check for $16,975. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4; See, Tr. pp.115; 118, L. 18-25; 121, L. 9-
25; 122, L. 14-18). 
Appellant began delivery of the logs on September 17, 23 and October 30, 2004. One 
delivery was not possible, according to Appellant because of the difficulty in gerting the logs 
to the site. Respondent was aware that she had to pay for the shipping charges. (fr. p. 243, 
L. 19-22). The respondent knew of the multiple deliveries and was not upset. (fr. p.131, L. 
1-9). The appellant was on schedule with his deliveries. (fr., p. 130, L.21-25 through p. 133). 
The respondent, then, indicated that she wanted her money back. (fr. p. 135., L.19-25). 
Respondent then changed her mind and decided to continue with the appellant. (fr. pp. 
137, 139). 
On May 2, 2005, the parties were to continue with the project. (fr. p. 140). Delivery 
charges were expressly discussed by the parties. (See, Tr. pp.142-144). The appellant was 
still ready, willing and able to perform even thongh the costs will be higher to him. (See, Tr. 
p. 144). Appellant re-affirms that freight charges will be added. (See, Tr. pp. 145-146, for 
continuing issue on freight charges). Appellant becomes worried that respondent is not 
going to pay for freight charges. (fr. pp. 147, L.18-25 through 150, L. 4). Appellant is 
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threatened with a lawsuit and cancels the final log delivery (fr. p. 150); even though he 
could deliver the logs. (fr. p. 155., L. 8-20). Appellant guaranteed logs on June 30, 2005 but 
was fired by respondent on June 24, 2005. (fr. p. 155. L. 17-20). 
Appellant makes a demand for payment on delivery charges less actual amounts 
paid. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 20; Tr. pp. 151-152). The Respondent refused to pay delivery 
which is standard in the industry. (fr. p. 161, L. 10-17). 
The Appellant had nothing to do with the building or stacking of the logs or of rental 
equipment but rather his contract was for delivery and unloading of logs. (fr., pp. 126, L. 1-
18; 158-159). 
Respondent owed appellant when respondent terminated the contract. The formula 
was usable logs 1404 X $10 lineal foot = $14,040 plus $3,310 delivery = $17,350 less amount 
paid of $16,975 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) equals $375 owing to the Appellant. (fr. pp. 162., L.24-
25 through 163., L., 1-6; See, Respondent's testimony of the same figure at Tr. pp. 252-254). 
She believed the range to be $655 to respondent; or, $375 to appellant depending on how 
many lineal feet were used of the logs delivered by Appellant. 
2. LEGAL EVENTS 
The respondent filed her legal complaint with the court dated August 31, 2005. (R., p. 
5). The appellant filed an answer, after service, on October 3, 2005. (R., p.26). Court trial 
was held on March 20-21, 2007. (R., p.37). 
The court made its initial ruling awarding the respondent $5,087.45. (R., p. 43A). 
The court, after reconsideration, then amended it ruling and awarded "cover" to respondent 
with an award of $17,078.38; and, with an award of fees and costs of $18,526.00. (R., p. 54). 
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The appellant timely appealed on November 8, 2007. (R., p. 66). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. The Appellant request his costs and fees at trial. 
2. The Appellant request his costs and fees on appeal 
ARGUMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The major emphasis of this case concerns the willingness of the appellant to perform 
upon contract after respondent refused to pay shipping costs. The initial remedy that 
should have alleviated the need for litigation was arbitration. Arbitration was the sole 
remedy provided in the contract. 
At trial, the court incorrectly determined the contract commencement date to be the 
tender of the initial deposit. Thereafter, the parties had agreed upon continuance of the 
contract from 2004 to the 2005 year. The respondent fired the appellant before he could 
complete performance. Thus, the breach was instituted by the respondent. Since the 
appellant did not breach the contract and merely wanted paid according to the terms of such 
contract, the legal doctrine of "cover'' did not come into play. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HA VE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE 
BECAUSE OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THE CONTRACT. 
Jurisdiction is always of prime importance in any case. The trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear this case because the contract between the parties indicated as follows: 
G. ARBITRATION 
All claims or disputes between the parties shall be decided by arbitration in 
accordance with the Construction Industty Arbitration rules of the American Arbitration 
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Association currently in effect unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. The award 
rendered by the arbitrator shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance 
with applicable law in any court of competent jurisdiction. In the event of arbitration or 
suit, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs of arbitration or suit including, 
but not limited to, reasonable attorney fees. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 3]. 
Questions of jurisdiction present an exception to [125 Idaho 376] the general 
rule and allow the appellate court to consider the issue even when raised for 
the first time on appeal Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 
357 (1982); Matter of Von Krosigk, 116 Idaho 520,521, 777 P.2d 742, 743 
(Ct.App.1989). 
Fix v. Fix, 870 P.2d 1331, 125 Idaho 372, (Idaho App. 1993) 
•••••••••••• Excerpt from pages 870 P .2d 1334-870 P .2d 1335. 
The district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims of the respondent as the 
contract preempted said court in favor of arbitration. Neither party could consent to 
jurisdiction or waive the same. Further, "neither party mutually agreed otherwise". 
Respondent was aware of arbitration and reiterated the same in Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, p. 2. 
Jurisdiction is composed of two parts: subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction. Lockhart v. Department of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 
894, 895-96, 828 P.2d 1299, 1300-01 (1992). Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
right and abstract power of the tribunal to exercise power over cases of the 
kind and character of the one pending. Id. Personal jurisdiction is the 
tribunal's power over the person before it. Id. 
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the arbitration clause, as 
the sole remedy, within the contract. 
3. THE APPELLANT DID NOT BREACH THE CONTRACT 
The appellant, as the facts have been received in evidence, did not breach the 
contract. The trial court incorrectly found the appellant to have breached the contract. 
Appellant stated in his testimony that he was ready, able and willing to perform on the 
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contract. (Tr. p., 163, L. 4-6). His Answer to complaint in Third Affirmative Defense 
indicated his willingness to perform. (R. p. 30). His e-mail (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20) indicated 
his willingness to complete the project ifhe received payment. (Also, see factual statement 
above with various cites to the transcript of appellant's willingness to finish the contract; See 
also, court finding number 7 at R. p. 45). 
Of major significance is the respondent's own testimony in the year 2005, wherein 
she has waived any prior problems of the parties and affirmatively states as follows: 
Q: And you had both let the past or the bygones be bygones, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: So as of May 1, 2005, you were working towards completing the cabin for that 
year; is that correct? 
A: Correct. (See complete transcript, Tr. pp. 244-246). 
The district court could not have determined, based upon the testimony, that either 
party had breached the contract as of May 1, 2005. (See also, Tr. pp. 253-254). The dispute 
occurred in June of 2005 when the respondent would not pay the delivery charges and the 
final amount owed. Respondent was aware of the charges and of the contract. (Tr. pp.246-
248; 253-255). It is also clear from the testimony of the respondent, herself, that appellant 
desired to finish the contract. (See, Tr. pp. 260-261). However, the respondent fired the 
appellant by attorney letter of June 24, 2005. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 23). Thereafter, appellant 
cancelled the ordered product and did no further delivery even though he was ready, willing 
and able to perform ifhe received the money due and owing to him. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20; 
Tr. pp. 145-147; 155; 244-246). 
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The respondent promised to pay the delivery charges (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, p.3) but 
refused to do so until all was completed and in a "separate check''. The appellant could not 
work for the respondent not knowing if she was going to pay for the services and materials. 
She refused. Respondent breached the agreement and caused the appellant to cancel the 
log order to be delivered on June 30, 2005. 
4. THE COURT COULD NOT SUPPLEMENT THE CONTRACT BY 
TESTIMONY IF THE CONTRACT IS CLEAR WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF 
THE CONTRACT. 
It is very clear that the contract was not ambiguous concerning the amount due and 
owing and upon the delivery charges. The contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, had the definite 
sums that were to be paid plus the delivery charges. Respondent owed the final amounts 
when the appellant tendered the product to the site. She acknowledged this fact. (fr. 
pp.246-248; 253-255). She already owed for past delivery charges and wanted to pay by 
separate check when the project was completed. Appellant re-affirms that freight charges 
will be added. (See, Tr. pp. 145-146, for continuing issue on freight charges). Appellant did 
not believe he would be paid. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20; Tr. pp. 145-147; 155; 244-246). 
As such, if the respondent had paid for the delivery charges thus incurred, the project 
would have been completed by appellant. As cited previously, the appellant cancelled the 
order when he was terminated on June 24, 2005. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 23). The court 
acknowledged the Appellant was willing to perform in June of 2004. (R. p. 45, par. 7). The 
delivery charges remain unpaid. 
The court attempted, in its findings and conclusions, to alter the contract formation 
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date; to alter the payments for delivery due to the appellant; and to insert negotiations 
leading up to the formation of the contract. The four comers of the contract are very clear in 
all respects on the issues the trial court altered. 
Preliminarily, we note our standard of review. The determination whether a 
contract is ambiguous presents a question of law over which we exercise free 
review. DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986). Where the 
language of a contract is clear, we deem the contract to be unambiguous. See 
Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 701 P.2d 319 (Ct.App.1985). 
Roeder Min., Inc. v. Johnson, 794 P.2d 1152, 118 Idaho 96, (Idaho App. 1990) 
------------ Excerpt from page 794 P.2d 1153. 
In construing a written instrument, an appellate court must consider it as a 
whole and give meaning to all the provisions of the writing to the extent 
possible. Magic Valley Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Professional Business Svcs., 
Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P .2d 1303, 1310 (1991). 
Schiewe v. Farwell,_867 P.2d 944, 125 Idaho 70, (Idaho App. 1992) 
------------ Excerpt from page 867 P.2d 949. 
Furthermore, it is presumed that preliminary oral stipulations, agreements, 
and negotiations are merged into the subsequent written agreement and "will 
not be admitted to contradict the plain terms of the contract." Valley Bank, 
119 Idaho at 498, 808 P.2d at 417. 
Thom Creek Cattle Ass'n, Inc. v. Bonz, 830 P.2d 1180, 122 Idaho 42, (Idaho 1992) 
------------ Excerpt from page 830 P.2d 1184. 
The trial court committed reversible error. The terms of the contract were clear on 
the formation date; on the duty of the respondent to pay for delivery charges; and, should 
not have been supplemented by preliminary negotiations. 
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5. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CONTAIN 
ERROR AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
A) The court could not "finalize" the contract until it was signed and completed. 
The court accepted the down payment contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 as the 
commencement date of the contract and indicated the contract was "formed'' on June 3, 
2004. The contract was signed August 12, 2004 by respondent; and, was signed by appellant 
on September 22, 2004. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). It is noteworthy that the contract sums were 
altered by both the respondent and appellant; and, the appellant did not have the entire 
plans to even begin the order on June 3, 2004. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4; See, Tr. pp.115; 118, L. 
18-25; 121, L. 9-25; 122, L. 14-18; 125). Granted, negotiations were occurring and discussions 
were had; but, the contract is very clear on the date it was signed and the contract formed. 
The court aclmowledged that the deliveries did not occur until after the contract was signed. 
(R. p.44-45, par. 5-6). The trial court erred by interpreting the contract formation date based 
upon preliminary negotiations in contradiction of the signed contract. 
B) The court's conclusion number 2 (R. p. 46) indicates that the delivery must be in 
a reasonable time period. The respondent aclmowledged, as cited earlier, that the parties 
had settled their disputes as of May 1, 2005 and, thus, all prior delivery date issues were no 
longer an issue. The appellant indicated that all logs would be delivered by June 30, 2005. 
Thus, no delay or unreasonableness as to delivery date could have been applicable. The 
court states: "McCandless (appellant) did not make delivery within a reasonable time and 
therefore breached the contract without excuse." May 1 to June 30 is a reasonable time 
period for delivery. The trial court arbitrarily ruled that the two month time period was not 
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reasonable. Given the fact that the respondent terminated the appellant, the court could not 
and should not have made such a finding and conclusion. The trial court erred. 
C) Nothing within the four comers of the contract would require appellant to 
construct or build the log home. In fact, it was specifically agreed otherwise. The court 
includes as damages equipment rental of $1,245.79 along with labor and expenses of $632. 79. 
These costs could not and were not the responsibility of the appellant. (See, contract 
between the parties, Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 and testimony outlined above). The trial court 
erred. 
D) The court erred in calculating damages between the amount paid and the 
amount delivered. Also, the trial court did not add the delivery expenses. The only potential 
amounts that could be found, to either party, were as follows: 
The appellant had nothing to do with the building or stacking of the logs or of rental 
equipment but rather his contract was for delivery and unloading oflogs. (Tr., pp. 126, L. 1-
18; 158-159). Respondent owed appellant when respondent terminated the contract. The 
formula was usable logs 1404 X $10 lineal foot= $14,040 plus $3,310 delivery= $17,350 less 
amount paid of $16,975 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4) equals $375 owing to the appellant. (Tr. pp. 
162., L.24-25 throngh 163., L., 1-6; See, respondent's testimony of the same figure at Tr. pp. 
252-254). She (respondent) believed the range to be $655 to respondent; or, $375 to appellant 
depending on how many lineal feet were used of the logs delivered by appellant. 
E) In the Memorandum Decision and Order on reconsideration, the court decides, 
for the first time, that "cover'' should apply. (This issue will be discussed later in this brief.) 
As~uming, uguendo, that "cover'' applied, the court's application of damages is incorrect. 
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At R. p. 55, the court determines that respondent overpaid by $4,913, which given the 
very best scenario, would be $655 to respondent. (See D above; appellant argues that he 
should have received $375.) The balance due on the original contract was $10,125. The 
court then concluded that the Western Contract for "cover" was $25,324.80 and did not 
subtract the amount of credit that usable logs and services that appellant supplied, to-wit: 
$17,350. "Cover'', if it were applicable, would be $25,324.80 minus $17,350.00 = $7,984.80. 
6. THE CONCEPT OF "COVER" DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE 
APPELLANT DID NOT BREACH THE CONTRACT. 
As argued previously, "cover'' would only apply if the appellant breached the 
contract. The appellant did not breach the contract because the respondent terminated bis 
services on June 24, 2005. The final delivery of logs was scheduled for June 30, 2005. The 
appellant reiterated, as stated above, that he was ready, willing and able to perform and had 
to cancel the order because the respondent terminated bis services. Factually, the court 
could not have made the determination that the appellant breached the contract because he 
was willing to perform and had the logs ordered. 
The respondent knew that appellant was willing to deliver if he received payment for 
delivery charges and the final balance owing. Legally, the doctrine of "cover'' could not 
apply because the appellant had the goods (logs) to complete the contract. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-713 provides in relevant part that the, 
" * * * measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the 
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the 
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential 
damages provided in this chapter * * *·" 
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Idaho Code§ 28-2-715 includes as the buyer's consequential damages, 
"any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of the contract had reason to know and which 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-715 only limits the buyer's right to loss of profits when 
cover is possible. If substitute goods cannot [98 Idaho 505] be purchased by 
the buyer he is entitled to loss of profits. 
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 567 P.2d 
1246, 98 Idaho 495, (Idaho 1977) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 567 P .2d 1255-567 P .2d 1256. 
Both factually and legally, the respondent was not entitled to receive the benefit of 
"cover'' as allowed in the revised opinion of the trial court. No expert testimony is found in 
the transcript on the issue of "cover''. The trial court erred. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. THE APPELLANT REQUESTS HIS COSTS AND FEES AT TRIAL 
Justice Jesse R. Walters, Jr. in his updated ptimer of the former Lon Davis manual on 
the award of attorney fees, A Primer For Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, Idaho Law 
Review, Volume 38, 2001, Number 1, indicates that the following steps are necessary for an 
award of fees and costs: 
A. A prevailing party; 
B. A statutory or contract basis for award of fees; and, 
C. Compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the case at bar, the appellant was owed $375 for the logs and delivery charges, less 
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all offsets, at the time the respondent terminated the contract. The appellant prevailed. 
Furthermore, the respondent improperly pursued this matter through the court 
system when arbitration was jurisdictionally proper. Thus, the appellant, once again 
prevailed. 
Finally, the respondent asked for $54,611.36 in monetary damages. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 30). Under any scenario possible, the respondent did not approach the requested 
sum. Once again, the appellant prevailed. 
The contract provided for fees in the arbitration clause. Appellant would be 
deserving of such fees pursuant to the contract. Appellant also relies upon I.C. § 12-120 
pursuant to the commercial transaction Iauguage of such statute. Appellant would then 
submit the appropriate documents pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P. to the proper tribunal for 
his award of fees and costs. 
2. THE APPELLANT REQUESTS HIS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL. 
An award of attorney fees on appeal requires a statutory or contractual basis. 
Appellant relies upon the contract and upon Idaho Code§§ 12-120; 12-121 and I.A.R., Rules 
40 and 41 in his request for fees on appeal. 
Fees are awarded on appeal as follows: 
Section 12-120(3) of the Idaho Code requires that the court heariug any 
action arising out of a contract for services award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party. This Court has interpreted I.C. § 12-120(3) to mandate 
the award of attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial. Chemetics, 130 Idaho 
at 258, 939 P.2d at 577 . 
• • . also asserts a right to attorney fees and costs on appeal based on 
I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, J.C. § 12-120 and I.C. § 12-121. As stated above, this Court 
has held that I.C. § 12-120(3) mandates the award of attorney fees on appeal to 
the prevailing party. Additionally, costs are properly awarded to the 
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prevailing party on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 
130 Idaho 342,353, 941 P.2d 314,325 (1997). 
Hummer v. Evans, 979 P.2d 1188, 132 Idaho 830, (Idaho 1999) 
------------ Excerpt from page 979 P .2d 1191. 
Fees should be awarded to appellant as a prevailing party pursuant to the contract, 
statutes cited, and Rule 54, I.R.C.P. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction as the arbitration clause in the contract was the 
sole remedy. Further, the appellant did not breach the contract but rather the respondent 
terminated and breached the same. The contract was clear upon its face and could not be 
altered or supplemented by parol evidence. The trial court's findings and conclusions are 
erroneous based upon the state of the record. "Cover'' does not apply since the appellant 
did not breach the contract. 
Fees and costs should be awarded to the appellant at trial and upon appeal. 
DATED this_/!}_ day of March, 2008. 
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Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
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Gery W. Edson, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondents 
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